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DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The question has been posed: suppose the signer admits that the
plaintiff pointed out the warranty of attorney? Few would deny
that the other party should be bound by the provision. But, if the
Foster case means what it says, this would not be the result, unless
the party signed the warrant where it appeared. Such emasculation
of the manifest intent of the parties is a drastic departure from the
generally accepted rule. As Chief Justice Bell stated in his dissent
in the Foster case:
The language could not be clearer, nor could the intention
of the parties be more clearly expressed.
I believe that Frantz Tractor Company, Inc. v. Wyoming
Valley Nursery, 384 Pa. 213, 120 A.2d 303, is distinguish-
able, because the warrant of attorney authorizing the con-
fession of judgment was so finely printed as not to be readily
legible and so close in type as to be blurred in places. How-
ever, if not distinguishable, I would overrule Frantz. For
these reasons, I dissent.
As a result, in many cases the proponent of a warrant of attorney
can be deprived of its effective use even though the party had full
knowledge of its existence and intended to be bound thereby at the
time the agreement was made. Clearly, a wholesale revision of busi-
ness and legal forms containing the warrant is now in order, and
many judgments now of record are vulnerable.
CONTRACTS - Uniform Commercial Code - Statute of Frauds -
The check was not a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the Statute
of Frauds provision of the Uniform Commercial Code-Requirements
writing must contain in order to fulfill such provision.
Arcuri v. Weiss, 198 Pa. Super. 506, 184 A.2d 24 (1962).
The plaintiff initiated an action in assumpsit for the recovery of a
deposit of $500.00 on the purchase of the defendant's restaurant
business. The defendant had offered his restaurant for sale and the
plaintiff made out and gave to the defendant a check payable to him
for $500.00 with the following note on the check: "Tentative deposit
on tentative purchase of 1415 City Line Ave., Phila. Restaurant, Fix-
tures, Equipment, Goodwill."
The defendant inquired several times as to what the plaintiff in-
tended to do regarding the transaction. Finally in May, 1958, the plain-
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tiff's attorney contacted the defendant and informed him that the
plaintiff was no longer interested in purchasing the restaurant and re-
quested the return of the $500.00. The defendant refused and this suit
was instituted to recover the payment made by the plaintiff to the de-
fendant. The trial court held for the defendant and the plaintiff ap-
pealed.
Considering and interpreting section 2-201 (1) 1 of the Uniform
Commercial Code2 which sets forth the requirements of a memoran-
dum necessary to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, the Superior Court re-
versed the lower court's judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee
and entered a judgment n.o.v. for the plaintiff-appellant.
The court felt that the use of the word "tentative" on the check
evidenced only a memorandum of a desire to enter into a final and
conclusive contract at a later date. Thus, the writing in question was
only a step in the negotiations between the parties. While recogniz-
ing that section 2-201 (1) of the U.C.C. has greatly liberalized the
requirements of a memorandum evidencing a contract, the court
decided it still requires some writing which indicates that a contract
for sale has been effected. The writing on the check was merely a
memorial of an incomplete agreement and the Statute of Frauds pro-
vision in section 2-201 (1) was not fulfilled.
The importance of the Court's decision is contained in its analysis
and brief comment on the U.C.C. Here the court reiterates and re-
affirms the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's interpretation of section
2-201 (1) contained in Harry Rubin & Sons, Inc. v. Conso7idated Pipe
Co.,3 recognizing that a memorandum need not contain all the essen-
tial terms of the contract.
In the Rubin case the plaintiff entered into three separate oral
agreements for the purchase of plastic hoops from the defendant, each
being in excess of $500.00. The defendant failed to deliver a sub-
stantial portion of hoops as required by the agreements. At the trial
the Statute of Frauds was asserted as a defense to two of the oral
contracts. The plaintiff contended that certain memoranda, a letter
and a purchase order, were sufficient to take both oral agreements
1. Act of 1953, April 6, P.L. 3, § 2-201, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-201(1).
"Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods
for the price of $500 or more Is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless
there Is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been
made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement Is
sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient be-
cause it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract Is not
enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such
writing."
2. Hereinafter referred to as the U.C.C.
3. 396 Pa. 506, 153 A.2d 472 (1959).
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out of the Statute of Frauds. The plaintiff's letter referred to the
oral agreements as orders.
The court held that the plaintiff's use of the word "order" in his
letter contemplated a binding agreement and, thus, removed both
oral contracts from the operation of the Statute of Frauds. Further
the court stated, that the object of the revision of the Statute of
Frauds in the code ".... is the elimination of certain formalistic re-
quirements adherence to which often resulted in injustice, rather than
the prevention of fraud. The present memoranda fulfill the require-
ment of affording a belief that the oral contracts rested on a real
transaction .... ,,4
The U.C.C. was designed with an eye to adjusting the law to fit the
practices of the business community. 5 A need for such a change was
based on evidence that the traditional legal concepts were not in
accord with commercial needs. 6 The present general rule governing
the sufficiency of a memorandum is: ". . . that the writing afford a
basis for believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a real trans-
action."17 The inclusion of specific terms is no longer vital;8 in fact,
they may even be incorrectly stated in the memorandum.
Section 4 of the Uniform Sales Act, 9 the predecessor of the U.C.C.,
while also requiring that there be a "memorandum in writing of a
contract or sale," was much more strictly construed. The court re-
quired the memorandum to do more than merely recognize the exist-
tence of a contract. "To satisfy the requirements of the Statute, the
signed, written memoranda must either contain, or together with
other writings adopted by reference, must disclose all of the essen-
4. Harry Rubin & Sons, Inc. v. Consolidated Pipe Co., 396 Pa. 506, 512, 153
A.2d 472, 476 (1959).
5. Carrington, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales, Bulk Sales, And Docu-
ments of Title, 15 WYo. L.J. 1, 5 (1960); Shattuck, The Uniform Commercial
Code-A Modernization of Commercial Law, 35 WASH. L. REv. 398, 411 (1960).
6. Id. at XL.
7. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Comment 2, § 2-201, p. 51; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12A, Uniform Commercial Code Comments, p. 85; Harry Rubin & Sons, Inc. v.
Consolidated Pipe Co., supra note 4.
8. Id.; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, Pennsylvania Bar Association Notes, pp. 83-
84; e.g. the writing need not indicate who is the buyer or seller.
9. Pa. P.L. 543, § 4 (1915), as amended, Pa. P.L. 310, No. 174, § 2 (1925), re-
pealed Pa. P.L. 3, § 10-102 (1953).
"A contract to sell or a sale of any goods or choses in action of the value of five
hundred dollars or upwards shall not be enforceable by action unless the buyer
shall accept part of the goods or choses in action so contracted to be sold or sold,
and actually receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the contract,
or in part payment, or unless some note or memorandum in writing of the con-
tract or sale be signed by the party to be charged or his agent in that behalf."
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tial elements of the alleged contact, and if any of such essentials are
missing or incompletely stated, the memoranda are insufficient."' 0
When this view is compared with the interpretation of the U.C.C.,
as evidenced by the comments to the code, the Rubin case, and the
instant case, the relaxation in the application of the Statute of
Frauds becomes quite clear. An indication of the change is the insig-
nificant place held by the price term in the U.C.C. While in the past,
it was always considered essential by the courts, 1I the feeling of the
drafters of the code was that the price term could easily be supplied
without danger of fraud by market prices, valuations current in the
area, existence of a reasonable price in the contemplation of the
parties, and the fact that the parties based their dealings on a price
list or catalogue known to both.' 2
Since the U.C.C. is now and most likely will be in effect in an increas-
ing number of states in the near future' 3 this decision is of great
moment. It is submitted that decisions of the courts of a state in
which the uniform law is in effect carry much weight in a foreign
jurisdiction operating under the same uniform law. Thus, when a con-
troversy arises in one of the other code states concerning section
2-201 (1), the decision in the present case will be closely scrutinized
and exercise great influence on the courts of such states.
It appears paradoxical that while the memorandum requirements of
the Statute of Frauds provision have been relaxed, a corresponding
restriction has been added that was not contained in the Uniform
Sales Act. Under the Uniform Sales Act in the absence of a memoran-
dum the entire oral contract was removed from the operation of the
Statute of Frauds upon the acceptance and receipt of all or part of
the goods or partial payment of the contract price. 14 This exception
applied equally to severable and non-severable contracts.' 5 Under
the U.C.C., however, the oral contract will be enforced only to the
extent of the goods delivered and accepted or which have been paid
10. North Jersey Sales & Constr. Co. v. Emerman Erie Steel Co., 169 Pa.
Super. 436, 438, 82 A.2d 307, 309 (1951).
11. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Comment 1, § 2-201, p. 51; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12A, Uniform Commercial Code Comments, p. 86.
12. Ibid.
13. States in which it Is now in effect: Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Ken-
tucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, and Wyoming.
States in which it will go into effect in 1963 and 1964: Alaska, Georgia,
Michigan, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and Oregon.
14. Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., 283 Pa. 434, 443, 129 At.
559, 563 (1925).
15. Ibid.
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for, such payment being accepted. 16 Thus, the traditional exception
to the Statute of Frauds now applies only to the portion concerned,
and in non-severable contracts, it does not apply at all. So, in a non-
severable contract, i.e., one involving a single object, when less than
the full payment is made, the code will not enforce the contract. 1 7
Where A makes a down payment of $300.00 on the purchase of a
refrigerator costing $500.00, the contract for sale will not be removed
from the bar of the Statute of Frauds and, therefore, will not be en-
forceable.
TAXATION - Income vs. Gift - Payments to Widow of Officer-Stock-
holder - Payments made to a widow by a corporation of which her
deceased husband had been an officer, director and shareholder are
not gifts unless they proceed out of generosity, affection, respect,
admiration, charity or like impulses.
Smith v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 305 F.2d 778 (3d
Cir. 1962).
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined deficiencies in
the taxpayer's income tax of $27,000 for 1955 and $22,000 for 1956.
In issue was the proper tax treatment under the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code of certain payments made to the taxpayer, widow of a
corporation's deceased officer and director. The Tax Court concluded
that the payments constituted ordinary income and upheld a defi-
ciency against the taxpayer.
Taxpayer's husband had been a director and officer of J. Wiss and
Sons, Inc., manufacturers of scissors, shears and kindred products.
His salary and bonus totaled $30,000 in each of the three years pre-
ceding his death. Eight days after his death, the board of directors
(all of whom were related to decedent) unanimously adopted a reso-
lution to pay, in recognition of decedent's valuable and loyal services,
to his widow, his unearned salary for the remainder of the year,
$33,000 a year for the next two years, and $5,000 as a death benefit
allowable under the provision of Sec. 101 (b) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. In adopting the resolution the Board had in mind the
fact that the decedent's death resulted in a curtailment of income
16. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Comment 2, § 2-201, p. 51; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12A, Pennsylvania Bar Association Notes, p. 85.
17. Williamson v. Martz, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 33, 35, 29 Northumb. L.J. 32, 34
(Pa. Com. P1. 1956).
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